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Abstract
In this introductory paper, I discuss the second-personal
approach to ethics and the theory of recognition as two
accounts of the fundamental sociality of the human form of
life. The first section delineates the deep affinities between
the two approaches. They both put a reciprocal social con-
stellation front and center from which they derive the funda-
mental norms of moral and social life and a social conception
of freedom. The second section discusses three points of
contrast between the two approaches: The accounts differ in
that the second-personal approach opts for a narrower
conception of recognition focusing on mutual moral account-
ability, whereas recognition theory suggests a broader con-
ception including relations of love, respect, and esteem.
Secondly, the accounts differ as to how they conceive of the
interrelation of the I-thou and the I-We relationship. Finally,
they differ with regard to the way they think of struggles for
recognition. Whereas the second-personal approach sug-
gests that we can understand struggles on the basis of a tran-
scendental infrastructure of second-personal address, the
theory of recognition considers norms of recognition as
themselves constituted by dialectical social struggles. The
paper closes with a reflection on the ways in which both
approaches can help us understand the social vulnerability of
the human form of life.
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It seems undeniable that the human form of life is essentially social. It is not immediately obvious, however, just what
this sociality consists in. Maybe it means that human beings are more acutely aware of other human beings and take
them into consideration as active forces to be reckoned with. Maybe it means that they do not just take them into
account as obstacles but make active use of them as a means to attain whatever it is that they, individually, have set
their mind to. Maybe it even means that they imitate and adopt modes of behavior observed in others and thus only
become who they are by means of others. Whether it is observation, instrumentalization or imitation, however, in
the description of all these cases, we tend to presume a given individual agent and confine ourselves to considering
how such an agent may be affected by or make use of its social environment in the pursuit of its ends and in the for-
mation of its own agency.
But saying that the human form of life is essentially social arguably has to mean something more. It must
mean that we have to understand to what extent individuals are not just conditioned by a social context but
constituted by and individuated by their social relations. We thus have to turn to shared activities and social
transactions that cannot be understood as the sum of solitary individual acts but are irreducibly social. Attend-
ing to the fundamental significance of these types of social activities, it transpires that what the term “human
being” designates is not an individual, intelligible in separation from others, however regularly it may interact
with them. Rather, the human being is its social relation to others. In that sense, there is no human “I” without
“You.” This is an idea that the philosophical tradition has expressed in many different ways: by the thought that
“if there are to be human beings at all, there must be more than one,” to quote J.G. Fichte (2000, p. 37); by the
idea that self-consciousness “only is … for another self-consciousness” and that “the human being … is
recognition,” as G.W.F. Hegel has it (2018, ¶175, ¶177, ¶178; Hegel, 1987, p. 197–98), or by the notion that
“persons essentially are second persons,” to quote Annette Baier (1985, p. 84).
The contributions in this special issue are concerned with bringing this fundamental and thoroughgoing sociality
of human existence into view. They share the sense that what defines this fundamental sociality is not mere consid-
eration, instrumentalization, or imitation; it is a form of social address or relation by means of which we first consti-
tute ourselves as members of “this complicated form of life” we call human (Wittgenstein, 1999, p. 174). The two
important strands of the recent discussion that have elaborated this view and are connected in this special issue have
characterized this mode of social relatedness more precisely as that of a second-personal relation and of mutual recog-
nition.1 According to these two respective frameworks, the distinctive character of human sociality comes to the fore
in the way in which human beings address and relate to others in the second person, as well as in the way in which
human beings do not just observe, or treat, or handle each other, but recognize one another in thought, speech, and
action. The relation of the second person and the relation of recognition are both essentially social in that both imply
a reciprocal relation.2 In addressing you second-personally, I claim a basic second-personal competence and authority
that I have to attribute to you as well, in order for it to make sense to address myself to you (Darwall, 2006). In addi-
tion, I need to presume that you recognize the authority and competence I claim for myself, while I also aim to move
you to acknowledge that, in demanding something of you, I do not one-sidedly impose my will but recognize your
own basic authority and competence. I thus have to grasp myself as the second person of the second person. Simi-
larly, if I seek your recognition, then this presupposes that I recognize you as being capable of and in a position to
recognize me. And attaining your recognition is only completed in my recognizing you as recognizing me. Neither
one of us, that is, can “recognize the other, if [we] both do not mutually recognize each other” (Fichte, 2000, p. 42).
Built into the structure of second-personal address and of recognition is thus a fundamental reciprocity, equality,
and unity of the participants included in this relation. And according to the two approaches connected here, this reci-
procity, equality, and unity concern our status as free and authoritative members of the moral community or as full
participants in a distinctively human form of life. What we mutually accord to one another by relating to each other
second-personally and by recognizing one another is our competence and authority, our rationality and freedom, or,
put both more simply and more broadly, our humanity.
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By drawing on the structure of the second-person standpoint and the struggle for recognition, the approaches
discussed below argue, we can thus rethink the very foundations of moral and political philosophy and rearticulate
their fundamental concepts. Any address of second-personal reasons, whatever its specific content and however
prosaic, carries with it presuppositions that “commit addresser and addressee alike to … equal dignity of persons and
to morality as a form of mutual accountability” (Darwall, 2006, p. 81), so that the basic concepts of morality are con-
tained in the mere form of second-personal address. Based on the concept of mutual recognition, on the other hand,
we can see that the justice of a social order is not simply a function of the distribution of goods to its individual par-
ticipants, but a function of the modes of interpersonal recognition it institutes. Social and political justice, thus, is not
simply a matter of redistribution but of overcoming structural forms of disrespect and misrecognition
(Honneth, 2004; Honneth, 2015): “our notion of justice is…linked to how, and as what, subjects mutually recognize
each other” (Honneth, 2005, p. 44).
Finally, both discussions suggest that considering the second-person standpoint and the structures of recogni-
tion provides us with a different conception of freedom: a social conception of freedom according to which freedom
is not a mysterious causal property of individual wills, but something I have in virtue of my relation to you and you
have in virtue of your relation to me (Strawson, 1968). Freedom is thus reconceived as a mode of “being with oneself
in the other” (Hegel, 1986, §7Z, p. 57). It is no wonder then that both approaches take participation in second-
personal address and in relations of mutual recognition not to be optional for the kinds of beings that we are, but as
constitutive of human existence. As Strawson puts it, the commitment to the participant's stance of interpersonal
attitudes is “part of the general framework of human life, not something that can come up for review”
(Strawson, 1968, p. 84).
In this way, the two general approaches discussed here turn to second-personal address and mutual recognition
to offer a new take on the very normative foundations of moral and political life. Their current significance, however,
also has to do with the fact that they articulate these foundations in ways that directly relate to present moral, social,
and cultural struggles—struggles confronting structural forms of inequalities and oppression that manifest themselves
in social hierarchies and differential treatment, structural violence and social exclusion, forms of misrecognition and
denial along dividing lines including race, class, culture, religion, gender, sexual orientation, and ability. Not all of us
are heard or taken seriously or addressed or recognized equally, something we would like to ignore or deny but still
“cannot just not know” (cf. Cavell, 2003, p. 191). The approaches discussed below help elucidate how fundamental
such injustice and violation is. It does not consist in just wronging someone by violating a distinct claim they may be
entitled to but in withholding full acknowledgment of their humanity. In turn, facing these forms of structural
inequality and oppression, the two approaches discussed here are confronted with the challenge of explaining to
what extent claims to mutual accountability and recognition can help overcome forms of inequality and oppression
or may in fact remain complicit with them. Given how deeply inequality and oppression have sunk into our epistemic
and practical attitudes, as well as into our social and political institutions (cf. Fricker, 2007; Medina, 2013), it is con-
ceivable that the apparent mutuality of our relations does not rectify but merely masks our deeper inequality.
Addressing myself to you second-personally and thereby generally granting you a formal authority and competence
may thus be a way to gloss over the hierarchical, unequal, and irrevocably one-sided relation I maintain with you,
masked by our formal equality. And to the extent “that public recognition is a common mechanism of all forms of
ideology,” a “critical theory of society that seeks to locate its normative foundation in the act of reciprocal recogni-
tion” has to confront the challenge that recognition may “take on the function of securing domination” (Honneth,
2007, p. 324).
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The specific task of this special issue is to bring these two recent approaches into dialogue with each other. Despite
the deep affinities between the core ideas of these two approaches just indicated, they have up to now rarely
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interacted. Bringing these two approaches into closer contact helps to define them more clearly and to understand,
by virtue of their contrast, the different options and challenges that are in play. On the other hand, it also allows us
to uncover ways in which these approaches can offer resources to each other for developing their views further,
extending them to different fields and maybe overcoming some of their own internal difficulties. Confronting the
second-person standpoint and the struggle for recognition can thus uncover unexpected points of contact and sur-
prising ways in which the various conceptions of the second-personal, bipolar, relational character of morality and
the various conceptions of recognition can complement one another. Exploring these connections also allows us to
identify unexpected connections between the anglophone and continental philosophical traditions in the background
of these two discussions, connecting Strawson and Hegel, Anscombe and Fichte, Baier and Arendt.
Let me briefly indicate three general points of contrast between the two approaches that play a role in the
exchanges collected in this special issue. Firstly, where the discussion of the second-person standpoint and related
approaches on bipolar or relational normativity primarily aim to make a contribution to moral philosophy, the theory of
recognition primarily aims to make a contribution to social and political philosophy.3 The first approach delineates a
second-personal relation and aims to derive from it the fundamental normative principles of moral accountability; the
second approach identifies multiple societal spheres of recognition and their respective normative principles needed to
enable just and flourishing forms of human co-existence. The difference regarding the area of primary concern here is
less important, however, than the resulting difference in view of the kind of reciprocal social interrelation the
approaches are interested in. The second-personal approach is not concerned with just any kind of address between I
and Thou but only with the address of a second-personal reason, that is, with me making a putatively legitimate claim to
someone else that involves us in a situation of mutual accountability. According to this relation, I owe the other “recog-
nition respect” (Darwall, 1977), acknowledging their second-personal competence and authority, but I do not owe
them loving appreciation of their particular needs, social esteem of their specific achievements or contributions, or an
acknowledgment of their individuality and singularity. Honneth's theory of recognition on the other hand distinguishes
three types of mutual recognition—love, respect, and esteem—and argues that full human self-realization requires rec-
ognition in all these dimensions. “What the subject seeks … through recognition” therefore ultimately is, as Robert
Stern puts it, “to be seen for who they are, as complete individuals—where this is wider than their second-personal
competence and authority (Darwall's recognition respect) or their status and standing (his appraisal respect)”
(Stern, 2021, p. 11). Recognition is thus not solely recognition of universal equality—be it equality in terms of equal
accountability or in some other register—but also includes recognition of difference and individuality, to which each
and every one of us is equally entitled. 4 It thus appears that the two frameworks suggest fundamentally different
views of the kind of recognition and respect constitutive of our social existence. According to the Hegelian line, not
only do we have to acknowledge a plurality of forms of recognition; it is even part of the account that the “acknowl-
edgment of quasi-juridical rights and claims” (Wallace, 2021, p. 6) constituted by the moral nexus has to be superseded
in view of a higher form of ethical recognition (cf. Stern, 2021). The second-personal approach, on the other hand,
insists that the more defined relation of individual moral accountability is primary and defines the kind of interpersonal
recognition we can actually expect and demand (Darwall, 2021a; Wallace, 2021).5 As R. Jay Wallace puts it: the ideal
of recognition is “not a foundational idea in its own right, so much as an element within a broader conception of the
relational structure of the moral norms that link moral persons with each other” (Wallace, 2021, p. 2).
A second point of contrast is the question of the interrelation of the I-thou and the I-We relation. The theory of
recognition introduces the dependence of human self-consciousness on the second person and its dependence on a
collective “We” in one and the same stroke, which highlights the complex interrelation between the I-thou and the
I-We relation. The kind of interpersonal relation that is needed to enable human self-consciousness on Hegel's
account is a form of reciprocal recognitive relation in which not only do I recognize you and you recognize me, but,
further, we recognize each other as recognizing each other. To be recognized, therefore, does not just require the sec-
ond person, but a shared “We” uniting the first and the second person. Looking on the relation from the other side,
we can say that for the actualization of the concept of spirit—according to Hegel's famous slogan: “the I that is We
and the We that is I” (Hegel, 2018, ¶177)—the respective “We” has to be articulated in terms of I-thou relationships.
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The relation of “I” and “We” is not the relation between a particular instantiation and its universal concept. Rather,
the shared “We” requires that there are different, distinguishable “I”'s in relation to one another which each have a
general claim to articulating what it is that “We” do. That also means that “We” is a fundamentally contested matter:
it is only accessible through my and your “claims to community” (Cavell, 1979, p. 20).
The second-personal approach does not highlight the role of the shared “We” uniting you and me to the same
extent, but it would be mistaken to suggest that it has no place for it (Darwall, 2021b). By relating to you second-per-
sonally, I attribute to you a basic competence and authority that we share and thus through my address make refer-
ence to, or constitute, a community with you. However, this community is, on Darwall's account, the moral
community solely established by the fact that we confront each other as second persons (Darwall, 2021b). The
recognitional approach, on the other hand, thinks that we have to bring into view more concrete and substantive
communities on the basis of which we can first encounter each other as “I” and “You” and which we in turn re-
articulate and reshape through our interpersonal exchanges. On Honneth's account (Honneth, 2021a), these more
substantive and specific communities which enable our second-personal encounters are not only relevant because
we cannot derive substantive moral norms solely from the second-personal framework alone (a version of the empty
formalism charge)6 but also because attending to those communities makes clear that we cannot neatly separate our
basic equality as persons from the asymmetries and inequalities of our substantive roles. In relations of mutual recog-
nition both are at issue, allowing us to raise the question as to whether the hierarchical nature of some of our sub-
stantive relations may be incompatible with the equality of our fundamental recognitive status.7
Finally, a third contrast concerns the fundamental significance of struggle and conflict in the elaboration of the
concept of the mutual relation each approach focuses on. The second-person standpoint elaborates a circle of moral
concepts that are co-constitutive and of which Darwall contends that “there is no way to break into this circle from
outside it” (Darwall, 2006, p. 12). The analysis accordingly proceeds in a transcendental manner, elucidating the nec-
essary presuppositions of addressing second-personal reasons. By doing so, it uncovers the necessary attribution of
shared competence and authority and thus reveals a normative presupposition that is part of every form of address
of second-personal reasons, whatever the specific content. Now, we will often address second-personal reasons
without fully understanding and acknowledging that we have thereby granted a shared, equal, basic authority and
have thus made our own authority dependent on its acknowledgment from a shared standpoint of equal, basic
authority, even where we claim a superior authority in a specific matter or role. It is quite conceivable that where we
fail to acknowledge this a “struggle for recognition” will ensue, aiming to hold us to account and forcing us to
acknowledge the authority and competence we ourselves have inadvertently granted. Yet, the second-personal
approach does not regard it as its primary task to account for the specific form of such struggles, but rather focuses
on first drawing out the normative presuppositions of any address of putatively legitimate claims.
The recognitional approach that is being discussed below, however, directly focuses on struggles for recognition.
It does so because it takes the relation of mutual recognition itself to be the product of such a struggle. It is, there-
fore, concerned with the way in which we actually enter the circle of concepts elaborated by the second-personal
standpoint and, more importantly, by the fact that the actual realization of this circle of concepts is capable of always
giving rise to new struggles that transform their concrete character. The struggle for recognition thus characterizes
both the genesis and the actuality of the constellation of mutual recognition. Characterizing how the concept of rec-
ognition first appears and develops, Hegel describes a “struggle of recognition”—a struggle of life and death—that
finds a first, failed resolution in the relation of master and slave, a one-sided and unequal structure of recognition.8
Characterizing the reality of recognition in terms of institutionalized structures of mutual recognition in the realm of
the family, civil society, and political life, we are confronted with further conflictual “struggles for recognition” con-
cerning the very terms, forms, and limits of recognition. The struggle is thus first conceived as the generative medium
of the very notion of mutual recognition, such that mutual recognition gains its validity from, and has to be under-
stood in view of the way it overcomes a one-sided recognition. Secondly, the kind of mutual recognition thus
reached is itself understood as the basis for further struggles about the very terms and forms this mutual recognition
should take. Thirdly, in this struggle about the terms, forms, and limits of recognition, there is always the shadow of
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the original struggle in which recognition as such was contested with the attendant possibility of the relation break-
ing down or reverting to an asymmetrical resolution falling short of recognition. To capture this complex struggle,
the theory of recognition proceeds not by means of a transcendental analysis of presuppositions of a given relation
of mutual recognition. Rather, it has to develop the concept of recognition dialectically and genetically.
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Let me now give a brief overview of the contributions to this special issue that explore these three contrasts in pro-
ductive ways. In their two papers and responses, Stephen Darwall (2021a, 2021b) and Axel Honneth (2021a, 2021b)
directly engage with each other's work extensively for the first time and propose different ways of thinking about
the relations of the theory of recognition and the second-person standpoint. Darwall characterizes both projects as
complementary, defining the theory of recognition as an explanatory theory of social and political change and his
own endeavor as a foundational theory of moral and political normativity. Against this background, the second-
personal theory of morality can provide a normative vindication of the theory of recognition that this theory arguably
does not provide for itself. From Darwall's perspective, Honneth's endeavor can in turn help us apply the second-
person account to nonideal conditions and contribute to our understanding of how the structures of second-per-
sonal accountability become operative in struggles for recognition. In his own contribution and reply, Honneth in
turn insists that his theory of recognition is not meant as a merely explanatory social theory but provides its own
normative account. He suggests that, on the level of normative theory, Darwall's and his own account disagree in
two fundamental ways. The first disagreement is about the ways in which the I-Thou relation is dependent on the
substantive norms of a shared We. By appealing to you second-personally, that is, I rely on what we share above and
beyond the mere fact that we relate to one another second-personally. The second disagreement concerns the con-
flictual character of our interpersonal relations. Accounting for our shared community requires reflecting on its con-
tested character by attending to the struggles for recognition that produce, challenge, and transform the nature of
this shared “We.” Two important sources for these struggles are social inequality and personal individuality.
Darwall's and Honneth's exchange is followed by two contributions by Terry Pinkard and Robert Stern that con-
sider the extent to which Hegel's recognitional account of the sociality of the human life form can be considered as
second-personal, one contribution by Sebastian Rödl reflecting on Fichte's conception of recognition and the second
person, and two contributions by R. Jay Wallace and Carla Bagnoli in turn reflecting on the way in which the bipolar
approach to morality relates to recognition.
Terry Pinkard suggests that explaining the sociality of human agency often makes use of the notion of a “game
of recognitional tag.” This model, however, is confronted with the problem that it either cannot show how that game
can get off the ground in the first place or has to presuppose a given agency that enables the respective agents to
enter such a game. Pinkard discusses two models, one he attributes to Fichte and Darwall, one exemplified by
Brandom, that on his account both ultimately fall short. He presents Hegel as offering a third way, giving up the idea
of a game of recognitional tag and instead elucidating the sociality of agency in terms of our participation in a social
practice that involves a social struggle about the very form of this practice. To understand this struggle, we have to
grasp the specific interplay between two levels of sociality, the I-thou and the I-We relation.
Robert Stern questions the extent to which recognition in Hegel is, in fact, a mutual recognition of moral author-
ity and accountability, as the framework of the second person would suggest. Even the initial struggle of recognition
that ends in the relation of master and slave can be understood as not being a struggle over authority, as is usually
presumed. More importantly, the real resolution of the struggle for recognition in the scene of forgiveness depends
on a mutual recognition not of each other's moral authority but of the limit of each other's accountability. My true
connection to the other is thus won not by reasserting myself as the other's judge or acknowledging him as my
judge; it is rather won by relinquishing the hard heart and acknowledging in mutual forgiveness our moral finitude.
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Recognition, it thus appears, is not simply a matter of giving each what is due but an experience of mutuality beyond
what is owed.
Sebastian Rödl develops Fichte's thought that “a freely acting individual is her relation to every other freely act-
ing individual” (Rödl, 2021, p. 1). Fichte has special significance for the encounter of second-personal and
recognitional approaches as he is a main figure of reference in both discourses. As Rödl points out, Fichte helps us
avoid two equally unsatisfying ways of thinking the sociality of human existence that the debate still oscillates
between. This sociality can neither be understood in terms of the internal projection of a given individual self-
consciousness (a conception that arguably remains monological) nor in terms of the additive external co-ordination
of two self-conscious beings (however dialogical that may look). Rather, the second-personal relation has to be
understood on the basis of an original division of self-consciousness.9
Finally, R. Jay Wallace and Carla Bagnoli reflect on ways in which relational conceptions of morality relate to the
theory of recognition. Wallace argues that an attractive conception of interpersonal recognition falls out of his own
conception of the moral nexus. This is a form of recognition that has deep affinities with the second form of recogni-
tion as specified in Honneth's theory of recognition. Whereas Wallace sees a role for the other registers of intersub-
jective appreciation of love and esteem as well, he considers interpersonal recognition to be primary. With regard to
this notion of interpersonal recognition, he then considers the hypothesis that mutual recognition, understood as a
valuable form of human relationship, is not just a correlate of the moral nexus but may have a more fundamental role
in actually providing moral norms with their “reason giving force” (Scanlon, 1999, chap. 4, sec. 5). While he rejects
the notion that recognition is the driving force first moving us to enter into moral relationships, recognition can make
an indirect contribution from within the moral standpoint, helping to vindicate the reason-giving force of moral
norms.
Carla Bagnoli finally returns us to Strawson's “Freedom and Resentment,” an important background text for
most relational and second-personal accounts of morality. Whereas Strawson's notion of the participant's stance is
of chief importance for these attempts by articulating a constellation of mutual moral accountability, Bagnoli draws
attention to Strawson's distinction between a participant's stance and an objective attitude toward another human
being, seeing her as an “object of social policy” and “a subject for what might be called treatment” (Strawson, 1968,
p. 79). As Strawson points out, the objective stance is not just adopted in exceptional cases, but can be understood
as a resource in other cases too, accessible from within the practical stance: “we can sometimes look with something
like the same eye on the behavior of the normal and the mature” (Strawson, 1968, p. 80). This points us to ways in
which the objective stance can be employed for strategic reasons. As Bagnoli develops, the divide between the two
stances thus is a matter of contestation and negotiation, giving rise to a “complex dynamics of recognition through
which the boundaries of the moral community are negotiated” (Bagnoli, 2021, p. 2). Attending to this divide can
therefore give us new resources for understanding the struggle for recognition and shine a light on oppressive forms
of withholding reactive attitudes and of neutralizing others by objectifying them.
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Drawing on insights from both approaches, we can see that the fundamental sociality of human existence manifests
itself in a peculiar vulnerability. It is a programmatic feature of the theory of recognition to focus on experiences of
disrespect, humiliation, and misrecognition in order to identify the pathological distortions of recognitive institutions
in contemporary society. Interestingly, the second-personal approach is also deeply informed by attention to norma-
tive injury. One class of examples informing this account are reactive attitudes that respond to a moral injury and
reflect the force with which it affects the will of the afflicted party. Both approaches thus reveal that the fundamen-
tal role of sociality for human life involves an immediacy and depth of interpersonal involvement that also means that
we can be immediately touched and hurt by other minds. From within the participant's stance we are, as Strawson
makes clear, capable of being touched or hurt by a mere attitude or intention toward us, and we can directly respond
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in kind: by taking a reactive attitude.10 From within the participant's stance, it thus seems that we possess a remark-
able “capacity for the meeting of minds” (McDowell, 1984, p. 351), our “two consciousnesses are unified into one”
(Fichte, 2000, p. 42), giving rise to a “unity [of self-consciousness] in its reduplication” (Hegel, 2018, ¶178).
The fact that the “problem of other minds” in some sense always already seems to be solved here, how-
ever, does not mean that the relation between you and me is one of agreement, harmony, or transparency. It
just means that the discord that may arise between us concerns and hits me directly, without filter, and without
the option of relegating its source to some external quarter that cannot touch me. If the other is a condition of
my self-consciousness, how the other addresses me or turns away from me concerns my very existence. This
already becomes evident in our capacity to be hurt by nothing else than a mere glance. It becomes even more
acute where someone does not merely look at me disparagingly but in a more fundamental sense withholds
acknowledgment of my status as a second person—withholds acknowledgment of my humanity. This is a viola-
tion that is not just painful but can also be stifling, as it questions my ability to feel pain of the same sort or in
the same way as the other. One cannot withhold the acknowledgment of the other's humanity without thereby
also mutilating oneself. And yet, we do it more often than we would like to admit. Avoidance of the acknowl-
edgment of this violation is a chief part of it. “It is the innocence which constitutes the crime,” as James
Baldwin so aptly put it (Baldwin, 1962).
So it seems that it is part of our essential sociality that we are capable of and feel moved to deny this sociality,
deny it to others as well as to ourselves: “Nothing is more human,” Cavell writes in The Claim of Reason, “than the
wish to deny one's humanity or to assert it at the expense of others” (Cavell, 1979, p. 109). Finding resources that
help us confront and dissolve at least some forms of such denial is an urgent task. I hope that you will agree that the
approaches discussed below can be instructive in various ways in identifying what confronting this task will require.
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1 Both terms are used in a broad manner in the following. The “second-personal” strand of the discussion I am pointing to
obviously includes Darwall's proposal of the same name, but is meant to extend to other related and competing proposals
developing the relational or bipolar character of morality as well (as e.g., R. Jay Wallace's approach in The Moral Nexus; on
the differences between Darwall and Wallace see Wallace, 2007, 2019, p. 238; Darwall, 2007, 2013). Similarly, the “rec-
ognition approach” mentioned above obviously includes Axel Honneth's extensive theory of recognition, but is also
meant to extend to other related and competing post-Hegelian approaches.
2 I do not mean to argue here that any essentially social relation is necessarily reciprocal, but merely suggest that reciproc-
ity is one type of relation that is irreducibly social, and that the two considered approaches put this front and center.
This is meant to leave room for the debate about the role and importance of dissymmetric social relations, either under-
stood as in some way internal to or as to be distinguished from the kinds of relations that are here being analyzed as
reciprocal. In connection to alterity, hospitality, care, gift etc. see Mauss, 2016; Lévinas, 1969; Løgstrup, 2020;
Derrida, 1999, 2006.
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3 However, as Darwall's contribution below (Darwall, 2021a) makes clear, he considers his second-personal account to be
relevant to both ideal and non-ideal theories of justice as well. Honneth, on the other hand, has suggested that the issue
of recognition endows social conflicts with a “moral grammar” (Honneth, 1996) and has also presented his conception of
recognition as a contribution to moral philosophy (Honneth, 2005). In that sense the contrast between the two
approaches only concerns the primary home of their respective notions.
4 See Taylor (1992); compare also Arendt (1958, p. 176): “In man, otherness, which he shares with everything that is, and
distinctness, which he shares with everything alive, become uniqueness, and human plurality is the paradoxical plurality
of unique beings… Speech and action reveal this unique distinctness. Through them, men distinguish themselves instead
of being merely distinct; they are the modes in which human beings appear to each other, not indeed as physical objects,
but qua men.”
5 It is an interesting fact that Strawson's own consideration of reactive attitudes, which plays such a huge role for the
second-personal approach, is itself not restricted to the realm of moral accountability. As he himself characterizes it, it
concerns a broader set of phenomena reflecting our attitudes of “love,” “respect,” and “esteem” towards one another,
manifested in affection or indifference, goodwill or malevolence, esteem or contempt (Strawson, 1968, p. 68), in direct
correspondence to the three forms of recognition Honneth identifies in the early Hegel. This raises the question of
whether the second-personal approach can be extended to a broader set of I-thou relationships beyond relations
of mutual moral accountability. See Darwall's recent attempts at expanding his account to include love, trust, and grati-
tude as second-personal relations in the broader sense; cf. e.g. Darwall (2016).
6 Note that in his contribution below Terry Pinkard (2021) suggests a reverse form-matter contrast regarding the articula-
tion of the I-thou and the I-We relation: the “‘I-We’ relation is, following Hegel, the apperceptive form of Geist, whereas
the content of Geist is filled in, at least at first, by ‘I-You’ relations” (Pinkard, 2021, p. 6, my emphasis).
7 This is an issue that could also be explored further vis-à-vis the second-personal approach which interestingly often eluci-
dates the equal and basic second-personal authority and competence we share against the background of an unequal
social authority, as e.g. in the relation of sergeant and private (Darwall, 2006, pp. 12, 60, 80, 125, 259ff.; cf. also Darwall's
discussion of slavery: 2006, pp. 263ff.)
8 For the intricate relation of life and recognition at this juncture, see Khurana (2017, §§90-95; Khurana, 2021).
9 On a related discussion of the monological or dialogical character of Darwall's second-personal approach
cf. Korsgaard (2007) and Darwall (2007).
10 Cf. on this point Løgstrup's striking comment on the way our mere attitude to the other affects their world (2020, p. 17-
18): “By our mere attitude to one another, we take part in giving shape to each other's world. Through my attitude to the
other person, I play a part in determining the breadth and colour that the other person's world has for them. I play a part
in making it broad or narrow, light or dark, varied or dull—and not least I play a part in making it threatening or secure.
This comes about not through theories and views, but through my mere attitude. This is why there is an unspoken, and
one might say anonymous, demand on us that we take care of the life that trust puts in our hands.”
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